I particularly like your mention of the Meno, since the theory of Recollection there may have a . . . complicated relationship with the kind of reminders
and recollections
that L.W. says it’s the philosopher’s task to marshal. Because on the one hand Wittgenstein seems to want to put some very tight constraints on how much these can possibly overturn about ordinary speech and practice. But on the other hand he clearly expects them to be surprising recognitions in some of the same ways. (So e.g. language-games are not something sublime but they are much richer and trickier than we are accustomed to see them as being, and much richer than any of the sets of ordinary categories we have for parsing up sentences, etc.) I wonder whether part of the difference in emphasis may simply be a difference over where Socrates and L.W. each tend to suggest that bafflement comes from — whether they see it as arising from a specialized, philosophical kind of approach, or whether they see it as frequently, spontaneously arising within seemingly non-philosophical
everyday talk and reflection. So if you think the problems you’re encountering are part of the former, then it might seem the taste for recognition is too dulled, like this is a sort of conceptual avant-gardism or gourmandism. If you think the problems you’re encountering are coming from the former, then it might seem like the taste for surprise is too dulled, like this is a sort of gluttony for conceptual comfort foods. But in both cases it looks like it is an attempt to get someone to see the surprising in the everyday, without losing focus on either. (So in conclusion, I guess what Polus actually should be doing is getting the gourmet grilled-cheese from an insufferable hipster food truck?)
Perhaps a theory of Recollection is a theory neither of surprise simpliciter nor of recognition simpliciter, but rather one of surprising recognition.
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