Most of this I heard on the radio yesterday evening. I add only (1) that there are no good reasons to care about constitutionality, but lots of good reasons to care about likely case law on the right of privacy, and (2) that it’s impossible to adequately convey such an oily, palavering voice in print.

DURBIN: The reason I asked you about those two cases is that neither of those cases referred to explicit language in the Constitution. Those cases were based on concepts of equality and liberty within our Constitution.

And the Griswold case took that concept of liberty and said it means privacy, though the word is not in our Constitution. And the Brown v. Board of Education took the concept of equality, equal protection, and said that means public education will not be segregated. …

Yesterday, when you were asked about one man, one vote, you clarified it. You said those were my views then, they’re not my views now.

When Senator Kohl asked you about the power and authority of elected branches as opposed to others, no; you said I want to clarify that’s not my view now.

And yet, when we have tried to press you on this critical statement that you made in that application, a statement which was made by you that said the Constitution does not protect a right to an abortion, you’ve been unwilling to distance yourself and to say that you disagree with that.

I think this is critically important, because as far as I am concerned, Judge Alito, we have to rely on the Supreme Court to protect our rights and freedom, especially our right to privacy. And for you to say that you’re for Griswold, you accept the constitutional basis for Griswold, but you can’t bring yourself to say there’s a constitutional basis for the right of a woman’s privacy when she is deciding — making a tragic, painful decision about continuing a pregnancy that may risk her health or her life, I’m troubled by that.

Why can you say unequivocally that you find constitutional support for Griswold, unequivocally you find constitutional support for Brown, but cannot bring yourself to say that you find constitutional support for a woman’s right to choose?

ALITO: Brown v. Board of Education, as you pointed out, is based on the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. And the 14th Amendment, of course, was adopted and ratified after the Civil War. It talks about equality. It talks about equal protection of the law.

And the principle that was finally recognized in Brown v. Board of Education, after nearly a century of misapplication of the 14th Amendment, is that denying people of a particular race the opportunity to attend schools or, for that matter, to make use of other public facilities that are open to people of a different race denies them equality. They’re not treated the same way — an African-American is not treated the same way as a black (sic) person when they’re treated that way, so they’re denied equality.

And that is based squarely on the language of the equal protection clause and the principle, the heart of the principle that was — the magnificent principle that emerged from this great struggle that is embodied in the equal protection clause.

Griswold concerned the marital right to privacy. And when the decision was handed down, it was written by Justice Douglas. And he based that on his theories of his theory of emanations and penumbras from various constitutional provisions: the Ninth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment and a variety of others.

But it has been understood in later cases, as based on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that no persons shall be denied due process — shall be denied liberty without due process of law.

And that’s my understanding of it. And the issue that was involved in Griswold, the possession of contraceptives by married people, is not an issue that is likely to come before the courts again.

It’s not likely to come before the 3rd Circuit; it’s not likely to come before the Supreme Court. So, I feel an ability to comment — a greater ability to comment on that than I do on an issue that is involved in litigation.

What I have said about Roe is that if it were — if the issue were to come before me, if I’m confirmed and I’m on the Supreme Court and the issue comes up, the first step in the analysis for me would be the issue of stare decisis. And that would be very important.

The things that I said in the 1985 memo were a true expression of my views at the time from my vantage point as an attorney in the Solicitor General’s office. But that was 20 years ago and a great deal has happened in the case law since then.

Thornburg was decided and Webster and then Casey and a number of other decisions. So the stare decisis analysis would have to take account of that entire line of case law.

And then if I got beyond that, I would approach the question. And of course, in Casey, that was that was the beginning and the ending point of the analysis in the joint opinion.

If I were to get beyond that, I would approach that question the way I approach every legal issue that I approach as a judge, and that is to approach it with an open mind and to go through the whole judicial process, which is designed, and I believe strongly in it, to achieve good results, to achieve good decision-making.

— CQ Transcriptions (2006-01-11): U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito’s Nomination to the Supreme Court

Later the same day, from the other side of the aisle:

BROWNBACK: … Judge Alito, the Supreme Court has gotten a number of things wrong at times, too.

That would be correct. And the answer, when the court gets things wrong, is to overturn the case.

Is that — that’s the way it works, isn’t that correct?

ALITO: Well, when the court gets something wrong, and there’s a prior precedent, then you have to analyze the doctrine of stare decisis. It is an important doctrine, and I have said a lot about it…

BROWNBACK: Let me just ask you, is Plessy wrong, Plessy v. Ferguson?

ALITO: Plessy was certainly wrong.

BROWNBACK: OK. I mean, and you have gone through this.

Brown v. Board of Education, which is in my hometown of Topeka, Kansas — I was there last year at the dedication of the school house, 50 years ago — that overturned Plessy.

Plessy had stood on the books since 1896. I don’t know if you knew the number. And I’ve got a chart up here. It was depended upon by a number of people for a long period of time.

You’ve got it sitting on the books for 60 years, twice the length of time of Roe v. Wade. You’ve got these number of cases that considered Plessy and upheld Plessy to the dependency.

And yet Brown comes along, 1950s case, poor little girl has to walk by the all-white school to go to the black school in Topeka, Kansas. And the court looks at this and they say, unanimously, that’s just not right.

Now, stare decisis would say in the Brown case you should uphold Plessy. Is that correct?

ALITO: It was certainly — would be a factor that you would consider in determining whether to overrule it.

BROWNBACK: But obviously…

ALITO: Doctrine that would consider.

BROWNBACK: Obviously, Brown overturned it, and thank goodness it did. Correct?

ALITO: Certainly.

BROWNBACK: It overturned all these super-duper precedents that had been depended upon in this case, because the court got it wrong in Plessy.

BROWNBACK: Is that correct?

ALITO: The court certainly got it wrong in Plessy, and it got it spectacularly wrong in Plessy. And it took a long time for that erroneous decision to be overruled.

One of the things, I think, that people should have understood that separate facilities, even if they were absolutely equal in every respect, even if they were identical, could never give people equal treatment under the law.

BROWNBACK: They don’t.

ALITO: I think they should have recognized that.

But one of the things that was illustrated in those cases — and Sweatt v. Painter, the last one on the list, brought that out — was that, in fact, the facilities, the supposedly equal facilities, were never equal.

And the continuing series of litigation that was brought by the NAACP to challenge racial discrimination illustrated — if illustration was needed, the litigation illustrated that, in fact, the facilities that were supposedly equal were not equal.

And that was an important factor, I think, in leading to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.

BROWNBACK: I want to give you another number, and that is that in over 200 other cases, the court has revisited and revised earlier judgments. In other words, in some portion or in all the cases, the court got it wrong in some 200 cases. And thank goodness the court’s willing to review various cases.

BROWNBACK: I want to give you an example of a couple, though, that the court hasn’t reviewed yet that I think are spectacularly wrong.

The 1927 case of Buck v. Bell; I don’t know if you’re familiar with that case. The court examined a Virginia statute that permitted the sterilization of the mentally impaired. Buck, a patient at the so-called Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded, was scheduled to be sterilized after doctors alleged that she was a genetic threat to the population due to her diminished mental capacity.

Buck’s guardian challenged the decision to have Carrie sterilized all the way to the Supreme Court, but in an 8-1 decision the court found that it was in the state’s interest to have her sterilized.

Majority opinion written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said, We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetents.

Clearly, some precedents are undeserving of respect because they’re repugnant to the Constitution. Isn’t Plessy repugnant to the Constitution?

ALITO: It certainly was repugnant to the equal protection clause.

BROWNBACK: And the vision of human dignity.

Isn’t Buck and those sort of statements by Oliver Wendell Holmes repugnant to the Constitution?

ALITO: I think they are repugnant to the traditions of our country. I don’t think there’s any question about that.

— CQ Transcriptions (2006-01-11): U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito’s Nomination to the Supreme Court

Here’s a typical, arbitrarily selected attempt by mainstream liberals to explain what’s wrong with the Bush administration’s enthusiastic support undisclosed, unchecked, and unaccountable domestic spying. This comes from Hilzoy at Political Animal (2005-12-18):

What George Bush has done, by signing his Presidential Order, is to produce exactly that accumulation of powers that Madison and the other framers of the Constitution were determined to prevent. He has decided to circumvent the courts’ power to decide whether the government has enough evidence to place someone under surveillance, thereby removing a crucial check on executive power, and arrogating one of the powers of the judiciary to himself.

Moreover, the power he seeks to strip the judiciary of is not a peripheral one; it is essential to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. …

In addition, in deciding that he has the right to disregard clear statutes, President Bush is arrogating to himself the power of the legislature as well. The Legislature has the power to make laws; the Executive carries out the laws the Legislature has written. Had George W. Bush wanted to, he could have gone to Congress and asked it to change the laws. Instead, he decided to simply ignore them: to act as though he had the powers that the Constitution reserves to the legislative branch.

He is, essentially, claiming that he has the right not just to execute the laws, but to write them himself, and then to judge their application. …

But if it’s hard to reconcile the administration’s position with the Constitution and the views of the framers, it’s even harder to reconcile it with anything remotely resembling common sense. Because, on this view, the President can do anything he wants — anything at all — during wartime. …

In this country we do not have an absolute monarch. We have a President who is bound by the rule of law, just like the rest of us. When he asserts the right to set the laws and the Constitution aside, and to arrogate all the powers of government in his hands in secret so that he can use it unchecked, we have an obligation to make it clear that he is wrong.

Now, to be clear, I think that the Right’s legal brief on behalf of the Bush administration is both specious and frankly dishonest; they’re wrong, and Hilzoy is right, about the question of positive law. But here’s the open question. There are actually two separate, or separable, objections that Hilzoy is lodging against the use of undisclosed, unchecked, and unaccountable domestic spying on in these passages. Specifically, Hilzoy is objecting both that

1. Bush has to claim the authority to disregard existing laws and the Constitution in order to justify undisclosed, unchecked, and unaccountable domestic spying (i.e., he’s operating outside of the standing law); and also

2. engaging in undisclosed, unchecked, and unaccountable domestic spying, in and of itself, involves arrogating all the powers of government into his hands (i.e., he’s diminishing the separation of powers, and thus claiming the right to more power than one person should have).

It should be clear that these two objections are separable. The Constitution didn’t have to be written with provisions for the separation of powers, and the Constitution and the laws can always be changed. If, for example, Bush had gotten Congress to repeal FISA, and, while he was at it, had gotten Congress and the several states to amend the Constitution to repeal or limit the Fourth Amendment, then he wouldn’t be vulnerable to objection 1, but objection 2 would not be affected.

Now, here’s the open question. If Bush had gotten the law and the Constitution changed so as to authorize undisclosed, unchecked, and unaccountable domestic spying, would that have made it O.K.? Would it have even made it substantially less bad?

If it would have, then why would it have? If it wouldn’t have, then why spend so much time and energy stressing the fact that he did tread on the statutory law and the Constitution, if you don’t think that that makes a substantial difference?

You know the rules. Here’s the quote. This week’s is not bus reading; it’s plane reading. Also a source for transcriptions for the Fair Use Repository (a note about that shortly). I give you a passage from William Lloyd Garrison’s On the Constitution and the Union, from The Liberator of December 29, 1832:

There is much declamation about the sacredness of the compact which was formed between the free and slave states, on the adoption of the Constitution. A sacred compact, forsooth! We pronounce it the most bloody and heaven-daring arrangement ever made by men for the continuance and protection of a system of the most atrocious villany ever exhibited on earth. Yes–we recognize the compact, but with feelings of shame and indignation, and it will be held in everlasting infamy by the friends of justice and humanity throughout the world. It was a compact formed at the sacrifice of the bodies and souls of millions of our race, for the sake of achieving a political object–an unblushing and monstrous coalition to do evil that good might come. Such a compact was, in the nature of things and according to the law of God, null and void from the beginning. No body of men ever had the right to guarantee the holding of human beings in bondage. Who or what were the framers of our government, that they should dare confirm and authorise such high-handed villany–such flagrant robbery of the inalienable rights of man–such a glaring violation of all the precepts and injunctions of the gospel–such a savage war upon a sixth part of our whole population?–They were men, like ourselves–as fallible, as sinful, as weak, as ourselves. By the infamous bargain which they made between themselves, they virtually dethroned the Most High God, and trampled beneath their feet their own solemn and heaven-attested Declaration, that all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights–among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. They had no lawful power to bind themselves, or their posterity, for one hour–for one moment–by such an unholy alliance. It was not valid then–it is not valid now. Still they persisted in maintaining it–and still do their successors, the people of Massachussetts, of New-England, and of the twelve free States, persist in maintaining it. A sacred compact! A sacred compact! What, then, is wicked and ignominious?

–William Lloyd Garrison (1832), On the Constitution and the Union, from William Lloyd Garrison and the Fight Against Slavery: Selections from The Liberator. Edited with an Introduction by William E. Cain. The Bedford Series in History and Culture.

Post your own on your website or in the comments, as you see fit.

I’ve been thinking for a while that I ought to start a feature leading up to the (upcoming) 5th anniversary of Geekery Today, called Dumb Things I’ve Said. The basic idea being that anyone who spends five years writing regularly on controversial topics is likely to change their views over time, and it’s better to spend your commemorative anniversary posts hammering out your own errors than clapping yourself on the back, because you’ve probably said things you later ended up thinking were pretty dumb. I’m no exception, and what I wrote a couple years ago in belated recognition of Bill of Rights Day is a case in point. I doubt that I’ll actually start the feature, but that won’t keep me from ragging on myself for today, at least.

It’s been 214 years today — December 15th — since the first ten amendments, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, were scribbled onto the end of the United States Constitution by order of the several states and the Congress of the United States. Folks with too much time on their hands have dubbed it Bill of Rights Day and think you ought to celebrate the grand legacy of those ten amendments. A couple years ago, I took the opportunity of the 212th anniversary to sing the praises of the Bill of Rights, to bemoan the erosion of some of their traditional protections, and hope that a brighter day would dawn soon. It was a bunch of nonsense, and I should have known that it was at the time, but it took me a while to really see through the dust that the canonical fairy-tales about legal history kick up.

Not surprisingly, I had started doubting the usefulness of leaning on the Constitution when I became an anarchist. But old cognitive habits die hard, and it wasn’t until last year, when I really started reading about William Lloyd Garrison and the rest of the disunionist abolitionists, that I began to feel anti-constitutionalism in any serious way, and it was largely through the Garrisonians that I came to realize the importance of making your arguments from moral basics rather than from legal hermeneutics. Voting abolitionists, and even Lysander Spooner, insisted on twisting the Constitution every which way they could to avoid the conclusion that it was (1) a pro-slavery alliance, and thus (2) an objective force for evil, the covenant with Death and agreement with Hell that Garrison denounced. But as interesting as Spooner’s argument was, it was really Garrison that was right about the Constitution (as I think Spooner came to realize later in his career); the important thing wasn’t constitutionality, but justice, which is not subject to legislative fiat. The Garrisonians, because so many of them were fervently religious, talked about a higher law than the Constitution; that’s partly right, but in a sense it’s also a matter of a lower, more human law; any serious theory of justice has to start from our ordinary claims to justice and dignity, the kind of demands that we ordinarily address to our fellow human beings (don’t attack me without reason, don’t trash my stuff, mind your own business if it’s not hurting you) rather than the ritual incantations that you might utter before a Court (Eighth Amendment, Public Use Clause, penumbral right to privacy, blah blah blah).

But as of a couple years ago my recognition of all this was nowhere near complete, and so my half-complete anti-statism didn’t stop me from singing the Bill of Rights’ praises, piously hoping that other branches of government would force the Bush administration to stick more closely to it, and absurdly describing it as that good old parchment barricade against tyranny.

Well, the thing about parchment barricades is that they don’t hold up very well against pressure. (That’s why you usually want to make barricades out of mud or bricks, at a minimum.) Constitutions don’t protect liberty; people do. Or don’t, which is the legacy the Constitution of the United States leaves us with today. Whatever protections the Bill of Rights was supposed afford white male citizens from the federal government, and whoever those protections were supposed to be extended to in the present day, we have (just to pick a few arbitrarily-selected examples) the FBI spying on us in secret, increasingly arrogant and militant paramilitary police ([1], [2], [3], [4], [5]) occupying our cities, a rampaging global war machine, deliberate and systematic gutting of habeas corpus, and a Justice Department that seems to believe that it can threaten and arrest people for failing to comply with secret laws whose terms they refuse to disclose. Either the Bill of Rights permits this kind of abuse, in which case it does not deserve the praise of rational people, or it forbids it but is incapable of stopping it, in which case it is useless.

In either case, my whining that this sort of thing oversteps this or that clause is bloody well irrelevant; the problem with invading people’s lives with unwarranted searches and seizures, government-sponsored religious persecution, seizing guns, maintaining a standing war machine, inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, or rounding people up and throwing them in prison forever without charges, is not that they’re unconstitutional; it’s that they’re evil. There may be cases where something is wrong just because it violates some bit of positive law — respect for human life demands that you drive on the side of the road other people drive on, but it’s a matter of arbitrary convention which side that should be — but these are certainly not that sort of case. The right to your own body, to self-defense, to your conscience, to peace and freedom, are prior to any law or compact, the only possible foundation for any just law or legitimate authority at all, and therefore not dependent on the Constitution saying one mumbling word about them.

Human rights don’t need to be written on scraps of paper to be worth defending, and wasting your time and energy wrangling over the right enchantments to invoke The Law on your side is a distraction and a sucker’s bet. I’ll take my rights. You can keep the bill.

Further reading

• GT 2005-09-17: International Ignore the Constitution Day
• GT 2005-09-02: Definition 2
• GT 2005-07-04: Burn, baby, burn
• No Treason! 2005-12-11: Bush Gets it Right

It now seems likely that Iraqi voters have ratified a new federal Constitution. No doubt things are turning a corner, we can see the light at the end of the tunnel, etc. We can be certain that this carefully crafted compromise will augur well for democracy and human rights in Iraq, and will certainly avert sectional strife and bloody civil war.

… because, hey, that’s worked out so well in the past. Right?

Further reading

• GT 2005-09-17: International Ignore the Constitution Day
• GT 2005-09-02: Definition 2
• GT 2005-07-04: Burn, baby, burn

Postscript, added 2005-10-18

to the barricades 2005-10-18 wonders whether the vote was fraudulent:

It seems apparent that something highly unusual, possibly fraud, has occured with regard to the recent referendum. First off, with regard to the Sunni provinces, who not only showed up in large numbers (153% more than in January) but according to results, the majority voted in favor of the consitution which is against all predictions and indicating factor

For myself, I wonder why an “honest” election would make the imposition of a statist Constitution on those who do not consent to it any more legitimate. Since when did anarchists start believing in government elections?