Contracts should be equitable, and agreed. Small print to an employment contract that says “Oh, and in case you disclose anything to which you have been made privy, that we regard as a trade secret, you agree that, as security, you transfer to us title to your house and all your other assets, to any arbitrary monetary value we imagine our secrets may have – and if at the end of your employment you have made no such disclosures, we will transfer title of those assets back to you” or some crap like that.
Who’s to decide the value of a secret?
Who’s to decide the value of whether I pick my nose or not?
It seems to me that if any employer was going to make non-disclosure a condition (or not picking one’s nose), that it should be equitable, e.g. both employer and employee deposit a security of $1,000 into a pot. If no disclosure occurs, the employee gets the pot. If disclosure does occur, the employer gets the pot.
But, of course, one is always at liberty to disclose the secrets to which one has been made privy.
]]>Are you suggesting that ‘breach of contract’ is a crime? A misdemeanour? A civil offence? What?
Contracts concern the exchange of property. They do not concern bondage – keeping people to their promises – punishing them if they do not. Such a naive idea of contracts is popular, but not libertarian. People are confused by the use of ‘promise’ as in “I promise my property in exchange for your labour”, and then think it similarly applies in “I promise my labour in exchange for your property”. The property is alienable. The labour is not. The word ‘promise’ should thus be avoided. Hence “I agree to give you my property on condition you perform your labour” and “I agree to accept your property on condition I perform my labour”.
Liberty does not need a court to ‘flesh out’ which liberties may be ‘safely’ subject to contract, and which ones it would be unconscionable to. They are all unconscionable.
]]>According to the latter definition, one cannot contract away one’s liberty to disclose something to which one has been made privy.
Contracts are bondage only of property, not people, nor their bodies, nor their mouths.
Someone could make a contract that says “If I open my mouth and publicly disclose your secret then title to my $100 will automatically be transferred to you.” In this way the person would still have every inalienable right to open his or her mouth and speak, but would have an incentive not to. I bet some sort of “contractual trade secret” could be made out of this sort of contract, although I’ll leave that to others to develop who are more interested.
]]>If I sign a contract that says “I won’t tell your secrets”, and then I do, then I can be held to the terms of that contract that specify what happens if either party is in breach of contract. I cannot “sign away” my right to speak, which is inalienable, but I can put myself into a breach of contract by speaking.
Affirming the social standard is where we get into “justifiable” breach of contract, or contract terms that are “too restrictive”, “misleading”, etc. These kinds of things are why there are courts and adjudicators even in Libertopia. The cliche of “small print” is cliche for a reason, and it’s just such standards of conduct which, through application of the social standard, the ideas of clear and common language, inability to sell one’s self into slavery, unethical practices, even honest mistakes, can and will be fleshed out.
All without any need for recourse to statute law. Thus Mr. Kinsella’s assertion that he would prefer there be no statute law at all.
]]>According to the latter definition, one cannot contract away one’s liberty to disclose something to which one has been made privy.
Contracts are bondage only of property, not people, nor their bodies, nor their mouths.
If you tell me something you would prefer remained confidential, your policy of secrecy does not magically alienate me from my liberty to be discreet or indiscreet.
Let’s not allow the copyright inculcated notion of ‘intellectual property’ to fool us into believing that property can be defined by imaginary boundaries as well as physical ones.
What you keep secret from me remains your secret – and I violate your privacy if I burgle your office to discover it. However, that which you confide to me no longer remains secret from me – I am at liberty to further confide it in others, or indeed in all others, the public. Confidence is trust – not bondage. And contract cannot change this – I can no more sell my liberty to disclose your favourite colour than I can sell my liberty to pick my nose.
]]>