The Self-Confidence Argument
Some of you know that I am a philosophical anarchist. This conclusion is controversial: most people think that states can in principle have legitimate political authority over the people in them, and that some states really do. So no state can have legitimate political authority
is a conclusion in need of some argument to justify it. I’ve tried looking at the issue a couple of ways in a couple of different places. But those are both arguments that start from within a pretty specific, narrow dialectical context. They’re intended to address a couple of fairly specific claims for state legitimacy (specifically, individualist defenses of minimal state
authority, and defenses of state authority based on a claim of explicit or tacit consent from the governed). Maybe a more general argument would be desirable. So here is a new one. It is a general deductive argument with only five premises. All of its inferences are self-evidently valid, and most of the premises are either extremely uncontroversial logical principles, or else simple empirical observations that are easily verified by any competent reader. I call it The Self-Confidence Argument for Philosophical Anarchism.[1] Here is how it goes:
- This argument is a valid deductive argument. (Premise.)
- If this argument is a valid deductive argument and all of its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. (Premise.)
- Its conclusion is
No state could possibly have legitimate political authority.
(Premise.) - If
No state could possibly have legitimate political authority
is true, then no state could possibly have legitimate political authority. (Premise.) - All of this argument’s premises are true. (Premise.)
- This is a valid deductive argument and all of its premises are true. (Conj. 1, 5)
- Its conclusion is true. (MP 2, 6)
No state could possibly have legitimate political authority
is true. (Subst. 3, 7)- ∴ No state could possibly have legitimate political authority. (MP 5, 8)
Q.E.D., and smash the state.
Now, of course, just about every interesting philosophical argument comes along with some bullets that you have to bite. The awkward thing about the Self-Confidence Argument is that if it is sound, then it also seems that you can go through the same steps to show that this argument, The Self-Confidence Argument For The State, is also sound:
- This argument is a valid deductive argument. (Premise.)
- If this argument is a valid deductive argument and all of its premises are true, then its conclusion is true. (Premise.)
- Its conclusion is
Some states have legitimate political authority.
(Premise.) - If
Some states have legitimate political authority
is true, then some states have legitimate political authority. (Premise.) - All of this argument’s premises are true. (Premise.)
- This is a valid deductive argument and all of its premises are true. (Conj. 1, 5)
- Its conclusion is true. (MP 2, 6)
Some states have legitimate political authority
is true. (Subst. 3, 7)- ∴ Some states have legitimate political authority. (MP 5, 8)
. . . which admittedly seems a bit awkward.
It’s easy enough to figure out that there has to be something wrong with at least one of these arguments. Their conclusions directly contradict each other, and so couldn’t both be true. But they are formally completely identical; so presumably whatever is wrong with one argument would also be wrong with the other one. But if so, what’s wrong with them? Are they invalid? If so, how? Whichever argument you choose to look at, the argument has only four inferential steps, and all of them use elementary valid rules of inference or rules of replacement. Since each inferential step in the argument is valid, the argument as a whole must be valid. This also, incidentally, provides us with a reason to conclude that premise 1 is true. Premise 2 is a concrete application of a basic logical principle, justified by the concept of deductive validity itself. Sound arguments must have true conclusions; validity just means that, if all the premises of an argument are true, the conclusion cannot possibly be false. Premise 3 is a simple empirical observation; if you’re not sure whether or not it’s true, just check down on line 9 and see. Premise 4 is a completely uncontroversial application of disquotation rules for true sentences. And premise 5 may seem over-confident, perhaps even boastful. But if it’s false, then which premise of the argument are you willing to deny? Whichever one you pick, what is it that makes that premise false? On what (non-question-begging) grounds would you say that it is false?
See also.
- [1]I owe the idea behind the form of this argument to a puzzle that Roderick Long gave me a couple years ago.↩