This is a note from quite a while back, over at Kelly Dean Jolley’s common-place blog, which I stashed to chew on later, and which I’m chewing on a bit now. Here’s Jolley:
I've been thinking again about Wittgensteinian reminders, and, while I was doing so, I ran across the following from Henry James.
There are two kinds of taste, the taste for emotions of surprise and the taste for emotions of recognition.
It strikes me that much of the power of Wittgenstein's work in PI is only available to those who have the taste for emotions of recognition. In fact, I wonder if the juxtaposition of PI 127 and 128 is not itself a juxtaposition of the two tastes: in 127 Wittgenstein engages the taste for emotions of recognition and in 128 he denies the taste for emotions of surprise.
–Kelly Dean Jolley, Reminders and a Kind of Taste
Quantum Est In Rebus Inane (March 20, 2012)
- [Philosophical Investigations § 127:
The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a particular purpose.— CJ.]↩
- [Philosophical Investigations § 128:
If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.— CJ]↩